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FOREWORD
This paper was prepared for Project VULCAN, a study
of .. Arms Control and a Stable Military Environment, which
was made by the Special Studies Group of IDA for the
Department of State under contract No. SCC 28270, dated
24 February 1961. Dr. J. I. Coffey was the Project
Leader.
The author, Morton H. Halperin, a consultant to the
Special Studies Group, has done research in the fields
of arms control and limited warfare. He 'is a Research
Fellow of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard
University and a consultant to the RAND Corporation.
Judgments expressed are of course the author's and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute for
Defense Analyses or of any agency of the United States
Goverrunent.
JAMES E. KING, JR.
Associate Director of Research
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SUMMARY
The basic purpose of the proposal to ban the use of nuclear
weapons is to reduce the likelihood that they will be used in
any war., and particularly in a local war. Such a ban would not
seek to reduce the capability of the major powers to use nuclear
weapons in a local war or a strategic war. Rather, it would
seek to reinforce their present disposition not to use these
weapons in a local war. A ban on the use of nuclear weapons
would also help to slow the spread of such weapons to non-nuclear
powers.
Neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union has ever used nuclear
weapons in a local war. This fact as well as analysis of the
possible uses of nuclear weapons suggests their lack of utility
to either side. Both sides probably appreciate the contribution
non-use makes to stability at the local war level. There is now
a tacit and informal agreement not to use nuclear weapons.
There is a net advantage to the United States to transform
this tacit understanding into a formal agreement. A formal
treaty would strengthen present practice by spelling out the
risk for the decision-maker. It would increase confidence on
both sides that nuclear war was neither imminent nor inevitable.
This confidence could help to dampen the pre-emptive urge
0

The real worth of an agreement to ban the use of nuclear
weapons would depend to a very great extent on the nature of the
arms control measures and unilateral steps taken concurrently
with it.
iv

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
There are a number of ways in which one can study the problems of arms control. One of these is to analyze particular
arms control proposals and to explore their implications. Even
in trying to examine a particular arms control proposal there
are several different ways in which one can approach the
problem. One can posit a particular proposal in some detail
and then attempt to explore its implications; alternatively,
one can state a particular problem (for example, the Nth
country problem) and then seek to evaluate proposals which
deal with it. Finally one can look at arms control proposals
in relation to areas, for example NATO, space, or the control
of missiles. This paper will attempt to explore a particular
arms control proposal, specifically the implications and
problems in the adoption of a proposal banning the use of
nuclear weapons. l Even this particular proposal might be
lThis proposal is frequently stated as "the non-first use"
of nuclear weapons." The purpose of stating it this way
seems to be to affirm the point that if one side uses nuclear
weapons, the other is free to do so; however, this point seems
obvious and there are certain unfortunate implications in
stating it explicitly. It is certainly always true that if one
side breaks an agreement, the other is also free to, and in
fact is likely to do so. But to state it this way keeps
sharply in mind the possibility of violation and, in fact, seems
1

adopted in a number of different ways ranging from an informal
commitment of each side to a formal negotiated international
treatYe 2 The best way of establishing this arms control rule
will be discussed below.
This approach, of stating a particular proposal and then
exploring its implications, seems to be particularly valuable
when the proposal has been discussed and negotiated between the
two sides. For example, in studying the possibility of a ban
on nuclear testing, it seems most desirable to consider the
implications of the proposals introduced by the two sides at
Geneva, rather than some "ideal" nuclear test ban. The proposal
for a ban on the use of nuclear weapons has been made frequently
by the Soviet Union, and it is important to study its implications rather than (or in addition to) the implications of some
alternate proposals to meet the same goals.
In suggesting that the United States adopt a particular
arms control proposal and seek to implement it, it is important
to make clear first what the goals of the proposal are; then
to explore its other implications, and in particular, the costs
involved in its adoption, and to suggest what complementary
steps might reduce its costs and enhance its value; 'finally,
to indicate in what way the United States should go about
seeking to establish the particular arms control rule. This
paper will seek to deal with each of these in turn.

to sanction the breaking of the agreement. For this reason,
the proposal is here discussed as the non-use of nuclear
weapons, although in effect the two proposals are the same.
2The United States might make a unilateral commitment
not to use nuclear weapons. In this case its commitment would
have to be not to introduce nuclear weapons (i.e., no first
use) .
2

CHAPTER II
OBJECTIVES
A major purpose of the proposal to ban the use of nuclear
weapons is to reduce the likelihood that nuclear weapons will
be used in war, and particularly in local waro It is not at
all clear that even the formal adoption of this proposal by
the United States and the Soviet Union would substantially
reduce the likelihood that nuclear weapons would be used in
a local war. Unlike an agreement which eliminates capability
and provides an inspection system which indicates that the
capability has been eliminated, the adoption of this proposal
would not have any effect on the capability of the two sides
to use nuclear weapons in a local war. If it is to have
effect, then, it must affect their intentions and expectations.
There is a second and perhaps equally important goal
wh~ch might be furthered by the adoption of a proposal against
the use of nuclear weapons. This is the slowing down or
halting of the spread of nuclear weapons to other countriesQ
How this proposal might affect the spread of nuclear weapons
is perhaps not as obvious as its contribution to the first
goal. It nevertheless might be one of the important effects
of the proposal, and it seems to be one of the important
reasons for advocating it.
Finally, one must add the goal of contributing to the
likelihood of additional arms control measures. To some people
any limited proposal, particularly one that seems to have a high
3

probability of adoption if the United States advocates it, is
of value because it may contribute to further arms control.
The argument here is that every agreement established increases
the likelihood of future agreements and that such future
agreements are desirable. The argument is somewhat diluted
in relation to the proposal against the non-first use of
nuclear weapons, since such a scheme would not in itself call
for the establishment of any prototype international inspection organization
Nevertheless, just by increasing the
awareness of both sides of the possibility of arms control
arrangements and perhaps by increasing their estimate of their
desirability, the proposal might be a valuable step towards
additional arms control measures.
0

I turn then to the political and military evaluation of a
proposal banning the use of nuclear weapons. Attempting to
evaluate the adoption of this proposal, one is faced with the
recurring problem that it depends on what other political and
military measures are taken. The impact of the proposal on
America's military and international political posture depends
on what other arms control and political and military steps
are taken. Certain steps might enhance the value of the proposal,
reduce the costs of adopting it, and increase the likelihood of
its effectiveness. Other actions, if they are not coordinated
with arms control policy, might negate the value of the proposal
and increase its costs.

4

CHAPTER III
MILITARY EVALUATION
NUCLEAR LOCAL WAR
The question of whether the non-use of nuclear weapons in
local war is to the advantage of the United States involves
three separable problems. 3 First, what effect would a non-use
declaration have on the deterrence of local wars? Second,
would it be to the tactical military advantage of the United
States to introduce nuclear weapons in any or all local wars?
Third, would the use of nuclear weapons increase the likelihood
that a local war would become global to the detriment of American
interests? The discussion of the battlefield implications of
the nuclear weapons will assume symmetrical use by both sides.
Following this, I will consider briefly the possibility of
unilateral use by the United States, particularly against the
Chinese.
For a number of years the accepted doctrine, both among
the military officers and some private students of national
security policy, has been that the use of nuclear weapons in
a local war would be to the battlefield advantage of the United
States. Very recently, the climate of opinion in official circles
3For a more extended discussion of this question, see
Morton H. Halperin, "Nuclear Weapons and Limited War, n The
Journal of Conflict Resolution (June, 1961), pp. 146-66.
5

has changed with the belief that much greater emphasis must be
put on conventional forces. And the consensus among private
students has grown to the point where there are very few remaining
advocates of the use of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the view
that nuclear weapons are to the battlefield advantage of the
United States remains strong, at least in some parts of the
military establishment and among some of America's allies. In
addition, a number of those who oppose the use of nuclear
weapons do so almost entirely on the ground that a nuclear
local war could not be stable, and not because of any analysis
of the battlefield implications of their use. Thus, it may be
worth at least briefly reviewing the reasons why it appears that
the symmetrical use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield of a
local war is not to the advantage of the United States.
Perhaps the best way to proceed is to consider first those
hypotheses which have been advanced which suggEst that the
United States and the West would gain a tactical advantage by
the use of nuclear weapons. These propositions are: 1) that
nuclear weapons permit the saving of manpower, 2) that they are
more valuable to the defense than the offense, and 3) that the
United States can develop a superior arsenal for fighting a
battlefield nuclear war.
1. The assertion that the use of nuclear weapons in a
limited war would result in a saving of manpower seems to be
contrary to the fact. 4 It is likely to be true that if both
sides use nuclear weapons, the number of troops required to
hold an area will increase rather than decrease. High attrition
rates which would be inevitable with the use of nuclear weapons
would put a great premium on reserves, and while it is true that
units would have to be smaller and more dispersed, it does not
mean that the number of units will not be a crucial variable. S
4It should also be noted that it is by no means clear that
the United States is faced with a manpower disadvantage at least
in every area of the world. The problem is one of willingness
to reduce the comforts of the men in uniform, and perhaps to
increase draft levels.
SIn a nuclear war in which both sides used large numbers
of nuclear weapons in a small area, manpower may, in fact, become
irrelevant since the battle area would be completely destroyed.

6

2. The argument that nuclear weapons provide a strategic
advantage for the defense also seems to be contrary to the fact.
It is generally accepted that in conventional warfare there is
a major advantage to the defensive side; something like a threeto-one ratio is generally required to launch a successful offensive
action with conventional forces. Nuclear weapons, particularly if
they are mobile, as they now are, might drastically alter this
ratio, making it possible for forces of the same size or perhaps
even smaller to make major offensive breakthroughs. It is generally
argued that nuclear weapons prevent the massing of troops necessary
for offensive action. However, while the massing is necessary
for conventional offensive action, it is by no means clear that
with the use of nuclear weapons this would in fact be the case. 6
It should also be noted that, regardless of how the introduction of nuclear weapons affects the offense-defense equilibrium,
it is· by no means clear that the United States will always be on
the defensive in a local war. In some situations it may be seeking
to recover ground lost in the opening days of a local war, and in
some situations it may be seeking to fight a guerrilla group in
which case there may be no offense or defense at all.
3. Finally, there is the argument that the United States has
the capacity to develop a tactical nuclear arsenal superior to
that of the Soviet Union. In part, this argument represents a
lag from the time when the United States in fact had a tactical
nuclear capability superior to the Soviets. But there is no
reason to suppose that the Communists cannot put resources into
the relatively narrow area of the development of nuclear weapons
sufficient to equal the arsenal of the United States. In fact,
even without further testing, both sides probably now appear to
have arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons sufficient for all
conceivable local-war situations. 7
6In contrast to the discus&ion of tactical problems involving conventional forces, there are two difficulties in discussing
the tactical use of nuclear weapons. First and foremost, nobody
has ever fought a tactical nuclear battle. In addition to that
there is no clear consensus as to what a tactical nuclear battlefield
might look like. For a discussion of the alternative conceptions of
a nuclear battlefield, see "Nuclear Weapons and Limited War,fT.2£. cit.
7See Donald G. Brennan and Morton H. Halperin, npolicy Considerations of a Nuclear Test Ban," in Brennan (ed.), Arms Control,
Disarmament, and National Security
(New York: George Braziller,
Inc., 1961), pp. 253-57.
7

It is more likely that the United States, because of its
larger GNP and its larger research and development budget, could
develop a superior arsenal to the Soviets in the broad range
of conventional weapons. In the field of logistics as well, it
appears that the United States would gain a net strategic
advantage if nuclear weapons were not used. Although there may
be some exceptions,8 American supply lines,as they involve long
distances and depend on ports and airfields, are more likely to
be subject to destruction by the use of nuclear weapons . than
are the interior lines of the Soviet Union and Communist China.
Thus, it appears that focusing simply on the outcome of the
battlefield military engagement does not make it clear that the
United States would gain by the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
And in fact, a general consideration of the problem suggests
that the United States is likely to suffer a net loss if both
sides symmetrically use nuclear weapons. Which side gains or
loses is likely to depend on the particular aspects of a given
situation.
THE EFFECT ON STABILITY
It seems clear that the use of nuclear weapons in a local
war increases the likelihood that the war will become a general
war. This is true partly because it erases one of the major
boundaries between a local war and a general nuclear war, and
partly because it increases the likelihood that the war would
trigger a pre-emptive strike. Neither side has fought a local
war using nuclear weapons and thus both would have to ask themselves the question whether this means that general war had
become so inevitable that it was now necessary to pre-empt. 9
It should be clear that I am not asserting that it is impossible
to fight a limited nuclear war. I am merely saying that the use
of nuclear weapons in a limited war will generate strong pressures
which would make it less likely that the war would stay limited.
The very uncertainty as to what nuclear limited war would be like,
8For example, in parts of South and Southeast Asia, and in
Latin America.
9For a more extended discussion of this problem, see Morton
H. Halperin, "Arms Control and Inadvertent General War,fT prepared
for Project VULCAN, and "The Limiting Process TT (Mimeo),Harvard
Center for International Affairs, 1961.
8

what its implication would be, increases the chances that the
war would get out of hand and expand to general war. Thus, any
side contemplating the use of nuclear weapons for battlefield
reasons of the kinds discussed above must consider the possibility
that the use of nuclear weapons will trigger a general war. Along
with some of the points discussed above, as well as the notion
that nuclear limited war is likely to lead to great destruction,
the instability of nuclear limited war suggests that the United
States and the Soviet Union have a mutual interest in avoiding
the use of nuclear weapons. The uncertainty about the battlefield implications of nuclear weapons plus the certainty that
they will heighten the danger of general war may lead each side
to believe that it is in its interest to refrain from their use.
In this situation, one of the strongest motives for the use of
nuclear weapons might be the fear that the other side was about
to initiate their usee As is argued below, this may be one of
the important reasons why this arms control proposal is of value.
THE EFFECT ON THE DETERRENCE OF LOCAL AGGRESSION
The question of what deters and what does not deter is a
very complex and controversial one involving a number of
psychological and political-military questions. Here we are
concerned only with what is most likely to deter local military
aggression. The problem is complicated by the fact that one
must consider the deterring of a number of different potential
adversaries: the RUSSians, the Chinese, and local Communist
forces; and deterring them from a number of different kinds of
actions: overt aggression, guerrilla warfare, coups, subversion,
etc. For many of these situations, all forms of deterrence,
including the threat to use nuclear weapons, are likely to be
ineffective. One does not, for example, deter changes in the
loyalty of local military groups by American threats to use, or
American promises not to use, nuclear weapons. Thus, for a
large number of the problems of local defense, the threat of the
use or non-use of nuclear weapons is irrelevant. However, in the
case of overt military aggression, the nuclear deterrent may be
an important variable.
If one believes that the threat of overt military aggression
is a serious one, then it is important to ask whether the threat
to intervene with nuclear weapons is a more effective deterrent
than the threat to intervene with conventional forces. There are
two aspects to the question of the effectiveness of the deterrent.
The first is, does the enemy believe it; and the second is, how
9

serious does he think it will be if you carry out your deterrent
threat. The threat of massive retaiiation, if credible, is
effective in the sense that,if the other side really believes that
one will retaliate massively, it does not take the action. On
the other hand, a threat, for example, to intervene conventionally
may be credible and not effective because the other side decides
nevertheless to go ahead with the action. The threat to use
nuclear weapons in a local area will in one sense increase the
cost to the enemy of the action. It will increase the likelihood
that the local war will become general war and will increase the
expected physical destruction which the enemy will suffer. On
the other hand, precisely because it increases the shared costs
and shared risks of general war, the threat to intervene with
nuclear weapons may reduce the credibility of the threat. That
is, if the enemy comes to believe that the only way in which one
can intervene is by using nuclear weapons, then he may believe
that it is less likely that one will intervene. On the other
hand, if both have accepted the rule that nuclear weapons will
not be used, then intervention may appear to present less risk
of triggering general war and hence may be more likely. Given
the caution which even the Chinese Communists have shown in
initiating overt warfare involving the United States, it
appears that the credibility of the declaration to intervene
with U.S. forces is more important than the nature of the
intervention. It is more important to convince the Communists
that the United States will intervene in a local war rather than
to increase the nature of the cost if the intervention is carried
out. For this reason, it seems likely that the threat to use
nuclear weapons may decrease the deterrence threat, and a threat
to intervene conventionally (since, as was argued, it can be made
more credible), is more likely to deter overt Communist aggression.
There are several exceptions to the general points made
above which need to be made explicit. As was pointed out, there
are likely to be a number of areas in the world which the United
States is simply incapable of defending against determined Communist
aggressiono In some of these situations the United States may
want to fight simply to demonstrate its determination to fight in
other areas and to increase the shared risk of general war as
a way of deterring aggression. In this kind of situation, it
may be of some value to explode a nuclear weapon as a way of
demonstrating seriousness and resolve even if the West cannot
win the local battle. On the other hand, the use of nuclear
weapons in peripheral areas of this kind may appear to be too
dangerous and the West may be more likely to risk intervention
if it can do so conventionally with the expectation that the war
10

will in fact remain conventional. However, there will be a number
of areas where this whole discussion is in some sense irrelevant
since the United States will decide not to intervene in a local
war.
Secondly, there is the problem of whether or not all uses
of nuclear weapons would be symmetrical, that is, whether the
United States could use nuclear weapons against the Chinese or
against local Communist forces without the Soviets supplying
our battlefield enemies with the equivalent nuclear forces.
The Chinese are likely to have at least a small atomic arsenal
within a few years, but there will remain the questions of the
Soviets adding to the arsenal and the Russians or Chinese
supplying nuclear weapons to other Communist forces. It seems
likely that the pressures on the Russians would be extremely
great (and perhaps irresistible) to supply nuclear weapons,
particularly to the Chinese, or to send a "volunteer" nuclear
corps if the United States introduced these weapons on the
battlefield. Whether or not nuclear weapons were shared quickly
enough to be used on the immediate battlefield, the pressures
on the Soviets for the sharing of nuclear weapons in the longer
run would probably increase. Alternatively, the battlefield
use of nuclear weapons by the United States might bring the
Soviet Union into the war--compelled to intervene because its
allies did not have the technical capability to use nuclear
weapons. Such intervention could bring the world dangerously
close to general war. It would seem rather risky and somewhat
foolhardy to count on American unilateral use of nuclear weapons
in any East-West encounter; increasing the expectation that
nuclear weapons would not be used would reduce the pressure on
the Soviet Union to share nuclear weapons with the Chinese or
others of its allies, particularly during a tense battlefield
crisis.
Finally, there is the question as to whether or not,in
~ome areas of the world, the us§ of tactical nuclear weapons
lS not to the battlefield advantage of the United States.
Before discussing this point very briefly, it should be noted
that the other objections to the use of nuclear weapons would
not be.erased~ In fact, they might be strengthened by the
effectlve use of tactical nuclear weapons by the United States.
In addition to increaSing the danger of inadvertent general war,
there would be the costs involved in the great destruction
caused by nuclear weapons and the United States would still
suffer the political consequences of being the initiator of the
11

use of nuclear weapons. lO Thus, it may be true that,even in
situations where the United States would gain a tactical military
advantage by the use of nuclear weapons, it should refrain from
doing so because of other broader political and military considerations. No answer can, of course, be given to the question of
whether or not the use of tactical nuclear weapons is to the
advantage of the United States in a particular situation and
particular geographic area without a detailed study of the situation which was alleged to give this advantage to the United
States.
Perhaps the situation most often cited as falling in
this category is that of the defense of Formosa. But it is
assumed that nuclear weapons would be used by both sides only
in a very limited way dictated by the United States or used only
by the United States. Given any general local use of nuclear
weapons, Formosa is likely to be put out of commission very
rapidly. Here again it would probably be foolhardy for the
United States to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in the
Formosa Straits on the assumptions that the Chinese will not
be supplied with nuclear weapons by the Russians, or that, if
they get nuclear weapons, they will use them with extreme
caution and circumspection and against only naval targets. ll
Having argued that the non-use of nuclear weapons in local
wars would be to the political and military advantage of the
United States (as well as sufficiently to the advantage of the
Soviet Union) to suggest that there is some possibility of both
sides observing such restraint, I turn now to the question of
whether the proposed agreement will in fact increase the likelihood that nuclear weapons will not be used in a local war.
It should first be noted that there exists now a powerful
informal rule against the use of nuclear weapons. In none of
the encounters between East and West since the Second World
War has either side used nuclear weapons; in fact, one suspects
that neither side has seldom, if ever, come close to the
IOFor a discussion of these consequences, see TTNuclear
Weapons and Limited War," QQ. cit.
. ~l~ertainly this brief paragraph is not meant to be a
deflnltl~e discussion of the possibility of using tactical nuclear
weapo~s.ln the defense of Formosa.
But it does reflect my extreme
skeptlclsm that one can devise a means of using tactical nuclear
weapons at any particular location which gives enough assurance
of success to offset the political and military costs which would
come from the first use of nuclear weapons.
12

decision to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. Will this
proposal enhance the existing rule and contribute to its
stability, thus making it even less likely that nuclear weapons
will be used in future limited wars? This is the real question.
The answer seems to be yes. An agreement outlawing the use of
nuclear weapons will in fact contribute to the likelihood that
they will not be used. But the answer goes beyond the simple hope
that nations will observe the agreements which they sign.
The establishment of an agreement, particularly a formal
one, creates an additional cost if the rule is violated. Not
only must· each side calculate its costs and gains in using
nuclear weapons, but it also must estimate the costs and gains
in breaking an agreement in terms of establishing future
agreements and in terms of its position in the eyes of its
adversary, neutrals, and its allies. This may not be an overriding consideration but, in a close decision, it may be
marginally crucial at least for the West. In addition, the
proposal to break a treaty will probably force a more calculated
decision. It will, even more than at present, de-emphasize the
strictly military aspects of the decision and elevate the role
of political decision-makers. In addition, an agreement will
reduce the likelihood of nuclear weapons being used in a local
war because it will help dampen the pre-emptive urge which
even in a local encounter is one of the strongest motives for
the use of nuclear weapons. Since the side which uses nuclear
weapons first is likely to gain an important advantage, one of
the motives for use is the fear that the other side is about
to use the weapons. If one becomes convinced that the nuclearization of the war is inevitable, then there is much to be gained
on the battlefield by being the first to use the weapons. 12
Thus, an agreement which reduced each side's expectation that
nuclear weapons would be used by the other, an agreement by which
each side Signalled to the other that it did not intend to use
nuclear weapons, might be important in quelling the pre-emptive
urge to use nuclear weapons. It might be valuable in discrediting
the arguments of those who urge that nuclear weapons be used in
order to anticipate their use by the other side.
.
An agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons may make an
lmportant contribution to increasing the likelihood that nuclear
l2Although the political costs of initiating the use of
nuclear weapons are likely to be great and may to some extent
counteract this tendency.
13

weapons will not be used in a local war. This will be particularly
true if it is part of a combination of arms control proposals
and unilateral actions aimed at reducing the likelihood of a
nuclear limited war. 13 A declaration against the use of nuclear
weapons may be a necessary component of such a program, partly
because the program otherwise will seem to be lacking its capstone,
if the United States refused to pledge that it will never initiate
the use of nuclear weapons and did not seek such a pledge from the
Soviets. It may also be true that,since the Soviets have continuously been interested in securing the adoption of a proposal
against the first use of nuclear weapons, they may well insist
upon it or find it an attractive part of a package proposal on
nuclear weapons.
THE EFFECT ON THE INITIATION OF GENERAL WAR
As was implied above, the major military effects of a declaration against the use of nuclear weapons will be in the local
war area. It does not seem likely that such agreements will have
much of an effect on the decision to initiate general war. If
one side decides that it needs to initiate general war, it is
not likely to be deterred by the feeling that it will break the
arms control agreement. In the aftermath of a general war
between the United States and the Soviet Union, nobody is likely
to remember or to care about the violation of that particular
agreement. In addition, the pre-emptive urges which might lead
to such a war are not likely to be quelled in this case by a
pledge against the use of nuclear weapons. If general war
comes quickly, nuclear weapons might inevitably be used unless
much more drastic arms control measures were in effect.
The main effect which this agreement might have on general
war is to reduce the likelihood of its occurring inadvertently
~uring a nuclear limited war.
Any limited war might trigger
lnadvertent general war, but a nuclear one is much more likely
.
13Suc h a package is sketched briefly below. An alternative
lS elaborate~ in Thornton Read, A Proposal to Neutralize Nuclear
Weapons, POIlCY Memorandum No. 22, Princeton: Princeton Center
of International Studies, 1961.
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to do 50. Thus, any agreement which reduces the likelihood that
nuclear weapons will be used in a limited war reduces the danger
of inadvertent general war. 14

14For an extended discussion of inadvertent general war and
nuclear limited war as a trigger, see "Arms Control and Inadvertent
General War," .2E. • cit.
15

CHAPTER IV
POLITICAL EVALUATION
As was suggested above, a major political objective of an
agreement outlawing the use of nuclear weapons is to halt the
spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries. I will
first consider very briefly whether this is a valuable objective,
and whether or not this proposal might contribute to accomplishing it, and then will go on to consider some of the other
possible effects of an agreement banning the use of nuclear
weapons.
Although a few commentators have attempted to make a
contrary argument,lS most students of the problem have agreed
that it would be worthwhile to try now to halt the spread of
nuclear weapons to additional countries. The major argument
is that the spread of nuclear weapons will significantly
increase the possibility of an inadvertent general war because
it will increase the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons
in local wars and in the long run will complicate the problems
of deterring general war.
Small powers which have nuclear weapons might be more
likely to use them than either of the two major powers. They
lSFor the best example, see Fred C. Ikle, "Nth Countries
and Disarmament," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist XVI
(December, 1960), pp. 391-94.
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may, for example, use them in local areas, non-East-West conflicts,
but in a way which may cause the conflict to grow into general
war~
In addition, an irresponsible dictator could do a good deal
of damage with even a few nuclear we~pons if he ~er7 willin~ to
use them in a cold-blooded way, and If he were wllllng to rlsk
great damage to his own country. The possibility of a series of
blackmail attempts of this kind is not at all a pleasant one to
contemplate. Finally, the ~pread of nuclear weapons to additional
countries is dangerous because it may give them a false sense of
security and deter them from developing adequate conventional
forces to deal with their main military problems.
Assuming that it would be in the interests of the United
States to halt the spread of nuclear weapons to Nth countries,
the question is: How does an agreement banning the first use
of nuclear weapons contribute to this end? Perhaps the first
thing to note is that even if it does not, such an agreement
might neutralize some of the main dangers stemming from Nth country
possession of nuclear weapons. If Nth p'o wers could be induced
to join or support an agreement against the use of nuclear weapons,
there would be strong moral and political pressures on them not
to use such weapons in local encounters and especially not to
engage in forms of nuclear blackmail. And insofar as the two
major powers were prepared to enforce jointly an agreement
against the non-use of nuclear weapons, they would have a powerful check on irresponsible use of nuclear weapons by Nth
countries. Partly for just this reason, an agreement against
the use of nuclear weapons may contribute to halting the
diffusion of nuclear capabilities. If the small powers become
convinced that the major powers will not permit them to use
n~clear weapons, if they recognize that they will be forced to
slgn and observe an agreement banning the use of both the
~eapon~ and the threat of the use, they may have much less
l~ce~tlve to acquire a nuclear capability.
In addition, the
slgnang of an agreement against the use of nuclear weapons
and other measures aimed at strengthening the likelihood that
the.other major powers will not depend on nuclear forces for
thelr defense may be an important signal to the smaller powers
that nuclear capabilities are not an effective method of
defense.
There is a contrary trend, however, which suggests that,
at least under certain Circumstances, a U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement
not to use nuclear weapons might in fact trigger the diffusion
of nuclear weapons to other countries. A number of countries
throughout the world depend on American military forces for their
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security. A number of these, particularly European countries
such as Germany, feel that the only capability with which the
United States can adequately defend them is the American nuclear
force. The sudden stripping away of the nuclear defense may
make them feel naked and create strong pressures for them to
attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. Only.if America~s allies
are convinced that they can be defended wlth conventlonal
forces can the significant costs which would come from American
renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons be offset.
These costs would be of two kindso First, there would be the
feeling on the part of the allies that they had been deserted by
the United StatesG Since they probably would not, under the
circumstances, concur in the agreement, the United States
would have made a unilateral agreement with the Soviet Union
contrary to their wishes. In addition, the likely reaction of
the West European powers may be to attempt to create independent
or international, but non-NATO,nuclear force.s, for their defense.
Ideally, the signing of the agreement should trigger or be
accompanied (or perhaps preceded) by the creation of larger and
more adequate conventional forces. But until the European powers
and other U.S. allies become convinced that conventional forces
can prove adequate for their defense against a conventional
attack, the reaction to a non-use agreement is likely to be
towards a lessened conventional force effort in order to devote
additional resources to the development of independent nuclear
capabilities.
The difficulties involved in this problem are hard to overestimateo The Europeans, particularly the Germans and the
French, have become c~vinced over a number of years, partly
as a result of America's actions and American analysis, that
the use of nuclear weapons is a way of avoiding the use or
need of large conventional forces, and is an effective way of
defending them. This has become so engrained in their military
and strategic thinking that it will be very difficult to alter.
To some extent, the problem is an intellectual one. It can be
solved in part by exposing the Europeans to the kind of analysis
of th~ value and problems of the use of nuclear weapons which
has been carried on in the United Statese But the problem is
prob~bl~ much more political than intellectual--the problem of
convlnclng the Europeans that we are prepared to defend them,
that the abandonment of nuclear weapons is an action designed to
enhance their security and not to detract from it for some ulterior
American purpose. If this can be done, an agreement banning the
use of nuclear weapons might be an important symbol of the agreement
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of the West to improve its conventional forces and might be a
valuable stimulant to overcoming the opposition of other groups
within the allied countries. In its absence a U.S.-U.S.S.R.
agreement against the use of nuclear weapons may well trigger
the diffusion of nuclear weapons, rather than bringing it to a
halt.
Apart from the effect on the decision of allied nations and
neutrals to acquire or not to acquire a nuclear capability, there
will be other important political effects of an agreement banning
the use of nuclear weapons. In relation to the Soviet Union,
the negotiating of such an agreement may (or may not) open the
way to further arms control. Since the Soviets have traditionally
been interested in this agreement it may be possible to couple
it with an arms control agreement of interest to the United
States. This possibility should not be exaggerated. The Soviets
might well refuse to sign any agreement except one which embodied
their plan for general and complete disarmament. American willingness to sign the agreement at this time, however, followed by
many years of refusal even seriously to consider it, may give
another message to the Soviets. It may suggest to them, and
perhaps particularly to the Chinese, an increased American fear
of nuclear war and hence a decreased American willingness to
intervene in local area warfare. The Communists may view an
American proposal of such an agreement, whether formal or
informal, as a signal that the United States was retrenching, was
preparing to withdraw its commitments to overseas areas. Since
it may be true that the fear that the United States would use
nuclear weapons has in fact deterred the Chinese, in particular,
from launching overt military aggression in areas along their
border, the signing of an agreement banning the use of nuclear
weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union might be a
signal for renewed Chinese aggression. The Soviets, less fearful
that the local. aggression would trigger a nuclear general war
because the use of nuclear weapons had become less likely, may be
more willing to sanction overse9s aggression by the Chinese. Here
again, the crucial variable may be what additional steps the
United States takes.
As has already been suggested, AmericaTs allies are likely
to look upon this agreement with serious misgivings. If it is
an informal bilateral agreement, it may raise the old fears of
a direct accord between the two super powers at the expense of
their allies.
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Apart from the effect on their decision whether or not to
build nuclear weapons, neutralist nations are likely to respond
favorably to an American initiative to ban the use of nuclear
weapons. Probably without carefully considering the strategic
implications, most neutrals have been pressing for such an
agreement and would probably welcome an American initiative in
this field.
It is difficult to draw a balance sheet of the political
and military effects of a ban on the use of nuclear weapons.
It depends very much on what else is done. Possible complementary
steps will be discussed below, but it should be noted that the
proposal in any case should reduce the likelihood of a nuclear
limited war and hence the danger of inadvertent general war.
There will inevitably be costs associated with the reaction of
America's allies and gains, if slight, in terms of the
propaganda battle in the uncommitted nations. However, the
balancing of the costs and gains can only be done if one
considers concurrent unilateral and arms control measures.
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CHAPTER V
CONCURRENT ACTION
As was suggested above, the renunciation by the United States
and the Soviet Union 0.£ the use of nuclear weapons would have a
marginal, if perhaps crucial, effect on whether or not nuclear
weapons would be used in a local war, but it might not contribute to halting the diffusion of nuclear weapons to additional
countries. The actual impact of the agreement will depend on
what is done concurrently and how the agreement is proposed,
negotiated, and implemented. Concurrent acti0n in three fields-arms control, unilateral military polic~ and diplomacy--will be
discussed.
With the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing in September,
1961, there is little likelihood of a test ban in the near
future, so I turn to other arms control measures.
A comprehensive program to control nuclear weapons might
include a cut-off of nuclear production, reduction of stockpiles,
confining nuclear weapons to the territory of the United States
and the Soviet Union, and an agreement not to share fissionable
material or nuclear know-how with other countries. Without
seeking to analyze any of these extensively, I would argue that
they all appear to be in the interest of the United States and
might as a unit effectively halt the spread of nuclear weapons
and Significantly reduce the likelihood of their use in a local
war. Each of these proposals should be subjected to an extensive
analysis before it can be determined if it in fact would contribute
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to American security. Some of these might, of course, be easier
to negotiate than others--or all might be beyond the realm of
possibility.
Some of these steps might be taken unilaterally either with
the aim of inducing reciprocation or because they are valuable
in themselves independent of the Russian response. There is
already in effect a tacit agreement against the sharing of
nuclear technology which might well remain in force even if not
translated into a formal agreement. An unsuccessful attempt,
however, to negotiate a formal agreement might corrode the tacit
understanding and lead to nuclear sharing. The cut-off of production
and the removal of nuclear weapons, at least from forward areas,
deserve serious consideration as a unilateral step.
The removal of nuclear weapons from front line troops could
be done in a way which would not impair the ability of the U.S.
to wage a nuclear limited war, but which would improve the
chanc~s of a local war remaining non-nuclear.
Involved here is
the question of how to develop dual-purpose forces. The Army and
many analysts have suggested forces that can fight equally well
with or without nuclear weapons as the TTideal TT solution. There
are major problems, however, in actually sending a force into
combat equipped to fight both conventionally and with nuclear
weapons. If such a force were supplied with nuclear weapons,
it might ultimately use them under the strains of the battle
without authority to do so. Two alternatives are possible. One
is to have stand-by forces equipped with nuclear weapons should
the United States engage in a conventional limited war; the other
is to plan on restricting the use of nuclear weapons to supporting units outside the battlefield area, that is, by tactical air
forces and by short-range missiles. The major problem in such
use is that it may lead to an expansion of the war into areas
from which the nuclear weapons are coming. This problem might be
overcome in part by flying planes carrying nuclear weapons from
aircraft carriers. The United States has adopted the policy of
seeking to equip its troops to fight both with tactical nuclear
weapons and without--this seems to be the worst alternative.
Thus, I would argue that the removal of nuclear weapons from
front line troops enhances American security independent of any
agreement with the Soviet Union. This does not mean that the
United States should necessarily carry out the step unilaterally.
The Russians seem to be seriously interested in keeping atomic
weapons out of German hands and it may be possible to get some
concession from them--perhaps area inspection--as part of an
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agreement which kept nuclear weapons out of Germany. Much of the
unilateral benefit could be gained by moving nuclear weapons
off the front lines, but not necessarily removing them from
Germany.
A unilaterial renunciation of production might generate some
pressure on the Russians to conform. But even by itself it would
be a further signal of America's interest in neutralizing nuclear
weapons and its desire to avoid the use of nuclear weapons if
possibleG Whether in the long run the United States could afford
to abstain unilaterally from production depends on a number of
technical (and classified) factors including developments in
anti-missile technology.
One. additional unilateral military step needs to be discussed. That is the strengthening of conventional forces.
However, one point needs to be emphasized. From the standpoint
of actually fighting a local war, even with present conventional
force levels, the United States would be better off if both sides
refrain from using nuclear weapons. Allied conventional forces
are now too small (and are poorly equipped) partly as a result
of the belief that nuclear weapons are a substitute for manpower; but, as was argued above, with any given ratio of forces,
the United States does not gain (and probably loses) if both sides
introduce nuclear weapons on the battlefield. Having said thiS,
it is important to stress nonetheless the advisability, both from
a military and political point of view, of strengthening American
and allied conventional forces. Not only would this be an additional signal reinforcing a pledge of non-use of nuclear weapons,
but it would also be important in reassuring our allies that the
non-use pledge did not imply that we were not prepared to defend
them.
The strengthening of American conventional forces should be
accompanied by a strong diplomatic and propaganda effort stressing
America's determination to halt the spread of nuclear weapons
and outlaw their use, and at the same time stressing equally its
determination to stand by its commitments to defend its allies.
An effort should also be made to make clear to our allies that it
would increase America's capacity to intervene in local war as
well as the capacity to do so without touching off a general war.
Even without other formal arms control steps, an agreement
on non-use of nuclear weapons coupled with the unilateral steps
sketched above might be sufficient to halt the spread of nuclear
weapons and might reduce substantially the likelihood of a nuclear
local war e
23

